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Have policy distortions spilled over across wine markets?: 
Evidence from the French wine sector 
 
Evens Salies  
OFCE 
Bodo Steiner  
University College Cork, Ireland 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates cross-market effects of policy instruments that were implemented in the table and 
quality wine market as one of the pillars of market intervention in Europe’s Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) for wine. We explore two hypotheses regarding the spill-over of distillation policy 
distortions and quality downgrading. Empirical evidence from France, the largest producer of quality 
wines in Europe, provides support for the hypothesis that distillation policy distortions in the quality wine 
market have spilled-over to the table wine market. As predicted by our second hypothesis, we find 
evidence for quality downgrading, a phenomenon that has so far received little attention in the wine 
economics literature. 
 
JEL Codes:  Q11, Q18 
Key words:  Common Market Organisation for wines, distillation, spill-over effects, quality 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) introduced a wine regime in 1962 to support producers’ income and 
to address the implications of declining wine demand in Europe. The regime divided wines into 
two major categories: “quality wine produced in specified regions”, also known as “quality wine 
PSR” (thereafter, wines PSR), and “table wines” (European Commission, 2006a).1 Soon after the 
introduction of the EU wine regime, a structural surplus emerged during the 1970’s in the market 
for table wines (Mart, 1987). In response, a series of distillation measures were put into place 
during the 1984/85 marketing year. The European Court of Auditors reviewed the consequences 
of these policy measures, to conclude that they were a disguised and expensive method of 
disposing of surplus wine, that they did not encourage producers to improve the quality of table 
wines, and that distillation interventions transferred the problem of structural surplus from the 
wine market to the alcohol market (Mart, 1987). Since this early criticism of these policy 
measures, their economic implications appear to have been largely ignored, although their 
negative budgetary impact has continued to be significant. This paper addresses several 
economic consequences of distillation measures and quality downgrading in the context of 
France. It explores whether policy distortions have spilled-over across wine markets, focusing on 
the introduction of distillation support measures for quality wines in 1999. 
As Figure 1 shows, the cumulated budgetary cost of the distillation interventions has reached €15 
billion over the period 1980–2003, which represents about two third of total European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) expenditures for wine (total of €23 billion).2 
 
                                                 
1. This distinction was effective during the period we cover in this paper, 1980—2006. It has been revised since 
with implementation of the 2008’s reform of the European wine market. 
2. The EAGGF is composed of two sections, the Guidance section and the Guarantee section. Within the framework 
of the European economic and social cohesion policy, the EAGGF supports rural development and the improvement 
of agricultural structures (European Commission 2008a, b). 
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Figure 1: European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) expenditures  
(Guarantee section) on distillation interventions (Million EURO) 
 
Sources: 1980–1984 (Bartoli and Boulet, 1989), 1985–1998 (ONIVINS, 1994, 1998, 2000), 1999 (Innova, 2004) 
and calculations of the authors. 
 
More than twenty-five years since the Court’s report has been published, the complex and inefficient 
system of distillation and support measures (Duncan and Greenaway, 2008) was finally undergoing 
significant revisions when a 2007 European Commission proposal for a reform of the CMO for wine 
was accepted by the Council and Parliament in 2008. The implications include the stepwise phasing out 
of support for by-product distillation, potable alcohol and dual-purpose grape distillation, as well as 
crisis distillation measures by 2012 (European Commission, 2010, 2006c, 2007a, b; Council of the 
European Union, 2007; Europa, 2009).3  
                                                 
3. For emergency (crisis) distillation, the funding is due to fall from a maximum of 20% (2008) to a maximum of 
5% of the national funding budget over four years to 2012 (European Commission, 2010). 
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This reform could be considered as a milestone for a number of reasons. Faced with a continuously 
falling EU wine consumption of table wines (despite rising consumption levels of wines PSR), slow 
export growth (at a lower rate than imports since 1996) and rapid import growth (since 1996 the 
volume of wine imports into the EU-25 has been growing at a rate of 10% a year), the Commission 
predicted that excess wine production will reach 15 percent of annual production by 2010/11 
(European Commission, 2006c).4 The implementation and long use of various distillation measures 
to deal with excess table wine production has led to a number of market distortions. Since crisis 
distillation measures for table wines were designed to act as support measures, they can be expected 
to increase the wholesale prices of table wines. On the other hand, by allowing inefficient producers 
to maintain their activity due to distorted wholesale prices, their production activities are likely to 
depress table wine prices further. The implication of these side-effects is that one may question the 
effectiveness of distillation measures as income support measures, and wish to go beyond analyses of 
budgetary expenditure related to distillation (e.g. Spahni and Labys, 1992) by focusing on spill-over 
effects that can result in significant by-product distortions. As many scholars have shown before (e.g. 
Helmberger and Chavas, 1996), government intervention in one segment of a sector is likely to 
spread to another sector, for example in terms of production and price repercussions. Therefore, a 
hierarchy of desirable policies can be established based on by-product distortions, i.e. when private 
costs exceed social opportunity costs (Corden, 1997). Also in the context of the CMO for wine, it is 
to be expected that the closer the intervening policy is to the point of divergence between private and 
social marginal costs, the lower will be the by-product distortions in terms of labor and consumption 
distortions, as well as trade biases (Corden, 1997). 
                                                 
4. This estimate does not account for the quantities distilled with aid to the potable alcohol sector. The European 
Commission most commonly uses the ratio between the change in stock levels between the beginning and the end of 
the harvesting period and production as an indicator of surplus. Using this measure for the 2008/2009 harvesting 
campaign leads to an excess in wine production of 2.11% for all wines (4.54% if we exclude wine PSR: 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/wine/facts/winehist_fr.pdf). 
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2. Objectives and literature 
Considering a significant policy change in the marketing campaign of 1999/2000, which allowed 
EU wine producers to apply distillation measures to quality wines PSR from 2000/2001 onward, 
the following sections aim to analyze effects of distillation measures on markets for table and 
quality wines PSR. The objective is to identify the extent to which negative side-effects of 
distillation policy measures have emerged, in particular whether distillation policy distortions 
spilled-over across wine markets. Considering that the practice of quality downgrading has so far 
been neglected in the wine economics literature, the analysis focuses on the implications of both 
distillation and quality downgrading in the context of French wine production.5 
With regard to the incidence of quality downgrading, it is noteworthy that wine production from 
acreages devoted to table wines cannot be sold as quality wine while the converse is true, an 
issue that seems to have been overlooked in previous analyses: Article 39 of EC regulation 
1623/20006 states that “A table wine which has been the subject of a storage contract may not 
subsequently be recognized as a [wines PSR] or used in making a [wines PSR], …”. The 
converse is not true as stated in Article 56 of EC’s 1493/1999 reform whereby a “producer may 
[…] downgrade a [wine PSR], in particular to a table wine.”.7 Further, some flexibility existed 
regarding the transfer of planting rights of vines devoted to the production of table wines 
(Journal Officiel, 1998). Although article 4 of the text states that those table vines cannot be 
planted on production areas previously devoted to the production of quality wines PSR, rare 
                                                 
5. Quality downgrading consists of suppressing the right to label a wine as quality wine PSR. In France it is the 
suppression of the right to label a wine as ‘AOC’ wine. This wine is then marketed like ‘Vin de Table’ or ‘Vin de Pays’. 
In general, downgrading a premium quality wine to a lower quality wine implies this latter to be sold at a lower price. 
6. The text is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000R1623:EN:NOT, 
accessed March 24, 2011. 
7. The text is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:179:0001:0001:EN:PDF, accessed March 24, 2011. 
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exemptions could always be granted by the National Office of Geographical Indications, as 
stated in Article 4.8 
We concentrate our analysis on France for three related reasons. First, because of France’s 
overall market significance in terms of the production of table and quality wines PSR in Europe 
(47.3% in terms of value; average of 2002–2006: European Commission 2007c). Second, we 
anticipate to be able to generalize some of our findings beyond France, because France is an 
intermediate case between Italy and Germany in terms of its production volumes of quality and 
table wines.9 Compared to France, quality wines PSR occupy a larger share of the wine sector in 
Germany, whereas the proportion of table wines is larger in Italy.10 Third, France was chosen 
because of significant recent trends in terms of wine inventories and wine exports since 1998. As 
Figure 2 shows, the deterioration of the recent market situation for French quality wines PSR is 
related to the widening gap of declining exports and rising inventories, together with a rather 
stagnant consumption pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8. See also http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000223326&categorieLien=cid 
which shows legal evidence that the aforementioned derogation is still applicable). The last regulation (EC 
479/2008, Article 92) in force since August 2009 maintained this right until 31st July 2010. 
9. For example, in the 2005/2006 harvesting campaign, the ratio of the domestic consumption of quality wines PSR to 
total consumption in volume equals about 52% (the data are available online at http://www.onivins.fr/pdfs/216.pdf). 
10. This intermediate position of France has also been pointed out by Jayet et al. (1998) and Perretti (1997). As in 
other EU countries, geographical location and grape variety are factors governing the classification of German 
wines. A further factor, however, distinguishes the German scheme from any other. The sugar content of the grapes 
when harvested is the primary factor governing the classification of a German wine. This implies that any vineyard 
in Germany is potentially eligible to be awarded wine PSR for its wines if the grapes are ripe enough. 
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Figure 2: Situation in the market for quality wines PSR in France (in hl) 
 
Sources: 1980–1984 (Bartoli and Boulet, 1989), 1985–2005 (ONIVINS and Viniflhor, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2007). 
As we would expect from the above developments in the French wine sector, France contributes 
significantly to the distillation surpluses in Europe (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: French wines as proportion of total EU wines allocated for distillation  
(in percent; table and wines PSR) 
 
Source: European Commission (2008a, b). 
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However, given the diversity of the French wine growing regions in terms of volume and quality, 
the following analysis distinguishes three key producing regions (Aquitaine, Burgundy and 
Languedoc-Roussillon), and explores the extent to which distillation policy distortions and 
downgrading affected those regions in distinctly different ways.  
In contrast to our focus on EU distillation measures and quality downgrading, previous analyses 
of the EU wine market have largely focused on modeling the implications of price and quantity 
interventions under the assumptions of product homogeneity in the market for table wines 
(Salies, 2003) and for wines differentiated by quality (Jayet et al., 1998; Perretti, 1997). Jayet et 
al. (1998) also provide an analysis of distillation in a model of wine trade between European 
countries, as well as EU trade with foreign countries. The authors show that a 16% decrease in 
the administrative floor price for table wines sent to distillation implies a decrease of five to six 
percent in the price of wines PSR. Jayet (2001) investigates the welfare implications of a set-
aside program combined with support prices vs. an export subsidy program. The author 
addresses the regulator’s problem of determining the optimal set-aside premium for table wine 
acreages when producers vary with respect to yields, under the assumption that yield information 
is private (imperfect competition). The analysis suggests that when producers are price takers, 
market intervention can under certain conditions be welfare enhancing. 
Our paper contributes to the above literature by analyzing spill-over effects across wine markets 
related to distillation and quality downgrading. Our first hypothesis is that production spill-over 
effects can be identified in the market for quality wines PSR as a result of downgrading. Our 
second hypothesis is that subsequent to a policy change in the marketing campaign of 
1999/2000, which allowed EU wine producers to apply distillation measures to quality wines 
PSR from 2000/2001 onward, these distillation policy distortions have spilled-over effects across 
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wine markets. Our analysis of time series data and distinct segments of the French wine sector 
suggests that the effectiveness and efficiency of the CMO for wine is likely to have diminished 
further since the introduction of a crisis distillation scheme for wines PSR in 1999. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as following. Section (3) provides a more detailed 
discussion of distillation measures and downgrading in the context of France, also highlighting a 
producer perspective on these measures. Section (4) offers an econometric model to analyze 
distillation measures and downgrading, their impact on the market for table wines, as well as 
policy implications. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3. Distillation policies, quality downgrading and producer implications 
The following sections take a producer perspective on the key policy variables affecting table 
wine and quality wine PSR production, and discuss distillation policies and downgrading in the 
context of the three key producing regions of France. The aim is to provide a better 
understanding of both table and quality wine PSR markets. 
 
3.1. Producer implications related to distillation and downgrading 
Taking a producer perspective, the following flow chart (Figure 4) summarizes the key factors 
affecting producer decisions in the French table wine and quality wine PSR markets as they 
relate to distillation and downgrading, and displays what key regulatory measures were available 
until recently to producers at different stages of the production process. It shows in particular the 
role of downgrading of crop and must, and the anticipated implications on the table wine market. 
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Figure 4: Flow chart of key factors affecting producer decisions under the CMO for wine 
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Source: own, based on European Commission (2006a, b, c); EC regulation 1623/2000. 
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3.2. Types of EU distillation measures and their adoption in France 
The CMO for wines distinguishes four different types of distillation, two of which are voluntary, 
and two of which are compulsory to wine producers.11 First, there are compulsory distillation 
measures for surplus wines from “dual purpose grapes” (mainly wines from Charentes), which 
must be distilled if their quality falls below a certain level. Second, compulsory distillation exists 
for lees and marc, by-products of wine making, with the goal of avoiding over-pressing of grapes 
and thereby improving wine quality. Third, since 2001, the internal market measures include 
voluntary “crisis distillation” of table wines, and since the 1999-2000 marketing campaign crisis 
distillation for wines PSR. Fourth, there are voluntary distillation programs for the distillation of 
table and wines PSR into potable alcohol for use in the spirit drinks industry. The overall policy 
objective of all of the above distillation measures is to support producers’ income by creating 
price floors through supporting the market price for wine and products made from wine, 
although it is well established that such price floors are generally not only inefficient, but also 
ineffective measures for achieving producer price support (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 2004; 
Helmberger and Chavas, 1996). 
At least since 2006, the Commission has explicitly recognized that distillation measures are not 
only “outdated market support measures” (European Commission, 2006b), but that they also 
entail negative consumption externalities (public health issues) due to the artificial lowering of 
wine spirits prices (European Commission, 2006c). Further, even before the adoption of the 2007 
reform package proposal, the Commission had acknowledged that it is necessary to update and 
simplify the labeling systems (European Commission, 2006b), an issue that has been raised by 
                                                 
11. See European Commission (2006a, pp. 37–44) for a detailed description of these four measures. It is also 
important to note that, in the case of France (and for 2006), the amount of table wine distilled could not exceed 
450hl, and the subsidy could not exceed €5,000 per producer. As for wines PSR, only the latter applies (Journal 
Officiel, 2006). 
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many studies before (e.g. Steiner, 2004; Salies, 2005). It is thus not too surprising that the 
abolition of distillation measures and the simplification of the labeling scheme are two 
cornerstones of the CMO reform by the Commission. The adoption of these two cornerstones 
becomes all the more compelling if we consider the financial implications of the above 
distillation and related price measures on the EU budget. In 2003, a year in which comparatively 
low volumes of table wines were distilled, the EU’s budget for the total wine sector was about 
1.213 billion Euros (Innova, 2004, p. 51), 57% of which were spent on distillation measures and 
must utilization.12 
The significance of the above distillation and related price measures on wines PSR can be made 
more transparent if we consider the French wine sector in more detail. Figure 5 shows that 
compared to the distillation of table wines, which has declined significantly between 1980 and 
2005, the distillation of quality wines PSR shows an upward trend during the same period. Since 
we are most interested in the period between 1999 and 2006, we consider the distillation of table 
and wines PSR in the above three French key producing regions in more detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12. These figures were unchanged in 2005: 1.267 billion and 56%, respectively (see Viniflhor, 2008b). In 1998, the 
various forms of distillation represented an even larger portion of expenditure with approximately 61 percent; 
disposal of alcohol required about 21 percent, and aid for musts approximately 18 percent of the EU wine’s budget 
(DEFUSCO, 2007; Innova, 2004). Aid for the use of grape must as grape juice, for enrichment or “home-made 
wine-kits” were expected to reduce wine quantity and to balance enrichment costs for producers in southern and 
northern wine growing zone (see Innova, 2004, p. 45), but the share of this measure in the annual EU budget has 
been on average 13% for more than twenty years. 
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Figure 5: Distillation of table wines and quality wines PSR in France (1000 hl) 
 
Source: European Commission 2008a, b 
 
3.3. Quality downgrading and crisis distillation 
When the French market for quality wines PSR went into disequilibrium in the mid 1990s, it was 
perceived necessary by European regulators to intervene. Voluntary “crisis distillation” of table 
and quality wines PSR has received significant response from Aquitaine and Burgundy in the 
2004/2005 marketing year (Figure 6 and 7). Figure 6 also shows that Languedoc-Roussillon 
mainly relied on voluntary crisis distillation in earlier marketing years.  
 
 
Figure 6: Voluntary Crisis Distillation of table wines for three harvesting campaigns and in three 
regions of France (in hl; Aquitaine, Burgundy, Languedoc-Roussillon) 
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* Amounts in hl. Source: Viniflhor, various years. 
 
Figure 7 provides a more disaggregate picture for the 2005/06 harvesting campaign, suggesting 
that the introduction of voluntary crisis distillation for wines PSR became attractive to producers 
in Aquitaine and Burgundy only four years after the introduction of the distillation support 
program in the marketing campaign of 1999/2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Voluntary Crisis Distillation for table and quality wines PSR in three regions of France (in 
hl, Aquitaine, Burgundy, Languedoc-Roussillon), 2005/2006 harvesting campaign 
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* Amounts in hl. Source: Viniflhor, various years. 
 
As the following sections emphasize, this delayed adoption of voluntary crisis distillation for 
wines PSR can be related to the level of support prices for wines PSR destined for distillation, to 
the production share of PSR wines in a given region, as well as to the practice of quality 
downgrading before voluntary crisis distillation became available for PSR wines. To begin with, 
the delayed adoption of voluntary distillation of wines PSR in 2005/06 despite the availability of 
voluntary crisis distillation since 2000/2001 can be rationalized with the fact that the European 
Commission authorized EU producers to send 1.5 million hl of wines PSR for distillation at a 
price of €3 only during the marketing year of 2005/2006. The French government elevated this 
price by adding an extra subsidy of €0.35 cents per liter (Assemblée Nationale, 2006), which 
most likely made distillation further attractive to producers.  
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As evident from Figures 6 and 7, the introduction of crisis distillation for quality wines PSR with 
the 1999’s reform has had a differentiated effect across French regions. Given the larger share of 
wine PSR in Aquitaine and Burgundy, it is not surprising that volumes of table wines distilled 
are low in those two regions. In the 2004/2005 harvesting campaign, these two regions used 
crisis distillation for their table wines in larger amounts than in 2000/2001 and 2001/2002, when 
Burgundy did not rely on the crisis distillation measure for table wine. The significant rise in 
table wine going to crisis distillation during the 2004/05 campaign and the significant shift that 
occurred during the 2005/2006 campaign when Aquitaine and Burgundy started applying the 
crisis distillation measure to quality wines PSR (Figure 7) appears striking, but could further be 
explained by quality downgrading (see our definition in footnote 5). However, data on 
downgrading is not publicly available which prevents us from quantifying its magnitude, yet we 
can infer from the 1999’s EU legislation as well as Bohle et al. (2010) and Perretti (1997) that it 
was common practice to downgrade surpluses of quality wines PSR as table wines until the 
introduction of the 1999 reform. The introduction of voluntary crisis distillation then provided 
quality wine PSR producers with one more degree of freedom beyond the practice of 
downgrading: to sell their wine to distilleries. In sum, we conjecture that the interplay of 
downgrading and crisis distillation incentives for PSR wines contribute to explaining the delayed 
and regionally differentiated uptake of voluntary crisis distillation for wines PSR. Figure 8 aims 
to make this interplay of downgrading and crisis distillation more transparent. The dashed line 
separates the pre- from the post-implementation phase of voluntary crisis distillation for wines 
PSR. The solid arrows show the materials flows, highlighting voluntary crisis distillation (arrow 
going south-north) as the distinguishing feature of the 1999 reform. The entries in brackets […] 
highlight the role of varying levels of support prices. 
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Figure 8: The introduction of crisis distillation and downgrading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to rationalize the varying amounts of quality downgrading further, consider that price 
support for quality wines PSR sent to distillation is generally less attractive than that for table 
wines. The former is below the average market price for quality wines PSR while for the latter, 
the price subsidy is above the average market price for table wine. For example, for the same 
marketing year in 2005/2006, the price in euro per hectolitres for 1 degree of alcohol was slightly 
less than 3€ when considering both the EU and French government subsidies (Assemblée 
Nationale, 2006). 
In order to more formally analyze the hypothesized policy spillovers between table and quality 
wine PSR markets, the next section employs an econometric approach. 
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4. Data and econometric model  
Our time series database covers the period from 1980 to 2006, and includes data on regional 
climate, wine crop volume and wine acreage. Weather variables were obtained from Météo 
France (http://www.meteofrance.com) and aggregated to annual variables. Variables for crop and 
acreages were obtained from VINIFLHOR.13 
We consider a model that allows us to capture potential spillover effects from the market of 
wines PSR to the market for table wines (equation (1)). The model relates table wine crop (twit) 
to table wine acreage (ait), and climate variables for the three key producing regions of France, 
namely Aquitaine, Burgundy and Languedoc-Roussillon (a more detailed discussion of climate 
variables follows below). The crop for wines PSR is also used as a right hand variable (qwit) 
since we would expect that as more wine PSR is downgraded, a positive effect of the crop of 
wine PSR variable will impact the market for table wines. However, with the policy changes 
implemented after the 1999’s CMO reform, it could be expected that most surpluses in the 
market for wine PSR are distilled, and that downgrading is used to a lower extent.14 We try to 
control for this downgrading effect by using a spline regression approach (Poirier and Garber, 
1974), which allows for a change in the slope coefficient by interacting the variable for wine 
PSR crop. The relationship between table wine crop and wine PSR crop is thus assumed 
piecewise continuous (linear) with its slope changing one year after the introduction of the 
1999’s reform.15 We would expect that if the spillover effect from wines PSR to table wines is 
stronger than the negative correlation in the evolution of crops over time (evident in Figure 9, 
                                                 
13. http://www.viniflhor.fr/. 
14. Nevertheless, we cannot control for this downgrading effect directly, since data on downgrading is not made 
public and yet downgrading was not forbidden over the time period considered in this paper. 
15. We consider a lag of one year. Although the reform was adopted in 1999, it started being implemented in the 
2000/2001 harvesting campaign. 
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below, particularly for Aquitaine and Burgundy), a positive relationship results between wines 
PSR and table wines in regions where quality downgrading affects the market for table wines. 
The selection of weather data is critical for our estimation. Since temperature has an effect on 
wine yields, we conjecture that weather variables could be employed for explaining crop output 
through their effect on yields.16 We employ therefore weather variables as they have been used 
before by Byron and Ashenfelter (1995) and more recently by Ashenfelter (2008).  We chose 
French weather stations from that city of a given region, for which the share of wine production 
was on average highest for the period from 1981 through to 2007. We consider the total rain fall 
in January and February (R1it). Given the importance of the weather during the growing season 
(Ashenfelter, 2008), we also consider two further rain variables to capture differences across 
regions, namely total rain during the period August–September (R2it) and during the period 
October–March (R3it). The effect of temperature is captured by using one sixth of the sum of 
monthly average temperatures in degrees Celsius over the period October–March (TEMPit)17 and 
the sum of differences between maximum and minimum temperatures from October to March 
(DIFFit). Following Byron and Ashenfelter (1995), we also consider the square of TEMPit, 
. The estimated equation can be stated as follows (all variables in small letters are in 
natural logarithm):18 
 
twit = β1+β2ait+β3qwit+β4Dt+β5Dtsit+       
                                                 
16. We thank a referee for suggesting to consider the sum of differences between maximum and minimum 
temperatures. We notice that yield variations can be significant. For France as a whole, crop yield decreased by 27% 
in the 1988–1989 harvesting campaign relative to the previous campaign, and it increased by 10% in 1996–1997 
relative to 1995–1996. 
17. Our definition of monthly average temperature is standard and identical to that in Byron and Ashenfelter (1995): 
.5 × (maximum temperature + minimum temperature). This formula is calculated for each day then averaged over all 
days of a given month. 
18. All regressions and tests were performed with STATA, version 10.  
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 β6R1it+β7R2it+β8R3it+β9TEMPit+β10(TEMPit)2+β11DIFFit+Vit.  (1) 
 
The difference between qwit and the log level of wine PSR crop in 2000 is denoted as sit; Dt=1 
for t ≥2000 and 0 otherwise, and Vit is the error term. 
 
Due to the small number of cross sectional units (three balanced regions, i = 1,…, N = 3, with t = 
1,…,T = 26 years in each region),19 pooling of the three regions is appealing as it would 
significantly increase the degrees of freedom. However, as suggested by several authors (e.g. 
Baltagi, 2005: 201), it is worthwhile to consider a heterogeneous panel before imposing false 
homogeneity on the model’s coefficients. Therefore, three time series regressions were first run, 
one OLS for each region with a piecewise linear spline function including wine PSR crop. Due 
to the aggregated nature of the crop data relative to the weather variables, considering all weather 
variables as right hand side variables could lead to multicollinearity problems. We therefore 
decided to follow a general to specific approach by performing stepwise estimation with 
backward selection. Only one weather variable was found to have an effect, namely total rain 
during the period October–March, and only in the equation for Burgundy. Durbin-Watson d-
statistics were calculated in each time series regression. They are equal to 1.76, 1.88 and 2.09, 
respectively and the adjusted R2 are .752, .738 and .933. Given these results, we removed all 
weather variables apart from R3it. 
In sum, since the coefficients on some variables vary substantially across regions, we have to 
address two related issues: whether we should pool the data or not and assume homogeneity of 
all coefficients or not across equations. Given the heterogeneity between our three regions in 
                                                 
19. We lose one year per region when converting three of our weather variables. 
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terms of share of table wines and distillation quantities, to impose parameter homogeneity when 
this is not justified could lead to wrong specification and conclusions. Furthermore, as suggested 
in Baltagi (2005), when there is little variation in some of the variables, this reduces the 
efficiency gains from considering homogeneity.20 Our data appears to be a case in point, since 
the variance of the rain variable is small and there is little variation in some of the remaining 
variables, particularly in Languedoc-Roussillon (see Figure 9). 
                                                 
20. To save space, we do not report the results of the homogenous panel with fixed and random effects. 
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Figure 9: Time series of the logarithm of crop volume (table wine and wines PSR) and acreage for  
  table wines 
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A standard Chow test could be employed for parameter stability across regions, but as this 
assumes homoscedastic errors, it is important to check for homoscedastic errors before pooling. 
A White test for the null of homoscedasticity leads us to accept the null: The calculated statistic 
follows a χ2 distribution with 21 degrees of freedom and is equal to 19.75 (the critical value is 
equal to 32.67).21 We subsequently tested for homogeneity by using first a simple Chow test with 
                                                 
21. We ran the test by considering only one weather variable, namely R3, as it is the only coefficient which is 
significant in the equation for Burgundy. All other variables are the same as they appear in equation (1). 
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all variables in the three equations. The Chow test’s statistics under equal variances is 11.89, 
which is well above the F (12,60) tabulated value of 1.91.  
Considering the above results, we decided to estimate a heterogeneous panel. We estimate a 3-
equations model for crop (one equation per region), assuming heteroscedastic errors but no 
within-region correlation.22 To save on degrees of freedom, we employ interactions with regional 
dummy variables. This approach not only allows us to pool our three regions, but permits also to 
test for specific cross equation restrictions. The test statistics that coefficients are the same for 
the three models follows an F distribution with 11 and 62 degrees of freedom.23 The calculated 
value of the statistic is equal to 28.71, which is well above the critical value (1.94) at the 5% 
significance level. This result is confirmed from joint tests for two regions at a time, notably 
between Aquitaine and Languedoc-Roussillon, and between Burgundy and Languedoc-
Roussillon.24 
The following model specification and diagnostic tests were performed: To check for 
specification errors, we performed a link test as implemented in STATA (linktest), which 
consists of regressing our dependent variable on the linear predicted value and the linear 
predicted value squared. Since we find that the linear predicted value squared has no explanatory 
power, we can conclude that the model is not misspecified (the P-value is equal to 0.963). 
Finally, we test for normality of the residuals by employing the D’Agostino, Balanger and 
D’Agostino (1990) test. We reject normality, which may be due to the presence of serial 
                                                 
22. Although we did not find evidence of heteroscedasticity by using the White’s test, we nevertheless estimate the 
model with Stata’s robust command. 
23. Since R3 is included in only one of the models, the number of constraints is 11 and not 12. More formally, the 
test is a joint test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on each variable of a given equation is identical to the 
coefficient of the two remaining equations, and the weather variable’s coefficient in the equation for Burgundy is 
equal to zero. 
24. The result of the test for comparing the coefficients of Aquitaine and Burgundy is less conclusive, with a test 
statistic equal to 8.42 whereas the tabulated F (6,62) is equal to 2.24. This can be explained by the similarity of those 
two regions in terms of the relative share of wines PSR they produce compared to the third region, Languedoc 
Roussillon where the production of table wines is more important. 
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correlation in the data. A test for the null of no first-order correlation in the residual by using the 
test suggested by Drukker (2003) leads us not to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% 
significance level (P-value = 0.074). Assuming that serial correlation could be a problem, we 
estimate this model by using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, with the autocorrelation based 
on Durbin-Watson and robust standard errors adjusted for our three regions. We do not reject the 
hypothesis that the error is normally distributed (at the 1% level; P-value=0.018). Based on 
skewness alone, we reject the hypothesis that the error is normally distributed at the 5% level, 
but not at the 1% level (P-value=0.020). Based on kurtosis alone, our distribution is not 
significantly different from the kurtosis of a normal distribution at the 5% significance level (P-
value=0.056). We retain this model for presentation (Table 1). 
Evens Salies et Bodo Steiner 
 26
Table 1: Estimation results from a heterogeneous panel, robust standard errors (1981–
 2007) 
 
 Acreage 
(table wine) 
Crop 
(wine PSR) 
Rain 
(Oct.-March) 
 
Intercept b 
  Pre-reform Post-reform a   
Aquitaine 1.073 *** 1.308 *** .452 c  .521 *** 
 (.068) (.125) (.207)  (.023) 
Burgundy .890 *** 1.899 *** 3.598 *** –14.24×10−4 *** 0.423 *** 
 (.049) (.195) (0.200) (2.98×10−5) (8.23×10−4)
Languedoc.-R. 1.747 *** .375 * −.414 *  .087 *** 
 (.061) (.124) (0.143)  (0.002) 
Notes: 
 “***”, “**”, “*” is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (standard errors are 
in parentheses); number of observations is equal to 78; the R2 for the system of equations is equal to 0.986. 
a. Coefficients in this column represent the change in the slope from the pre-reform. The cutoff point is the year 
2000. 
b. This is the intercept as employed in the spline regression for each region. 
c. P-Value of this coefficient is 0.161. 
 
The larger coefficient estimate on acreages in Languedoc-Roussillon is indicative of the higher share 
of table wine production and the generally higher yields in that region (Table 1). As expected, there 
is a positive effect of wine PSR production on the production of table wines, particularly in Aquitaine 
and Burgundy. As suggested earlier, this is not surprising since quality downgrading used to be a key 
practice in those regions, which also had a larger share of quality wines PSR, and where there was no 
distillation scheme in place to absorb surpluses of quality wines PSR (pre-reform). The estimate for 
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wine PSR in Burgundy also suggests that despite the reliance on crisis distillation since the 1999’s 
CMO reform, downgrading was more significant in this region not only before the reform, but also 
subsequent to the reform, despite distillation being available to market participants in the post-reform 
period. On the other hand, the smaller coefficient estimate for Languedoc-Roussillon likely reflects 
the lower share of wines PSR in that region and the lower reliance on downgrading. The negative 
post-reform coefficient in this region is consistent with the observation that producers from 
Languedoc-Roussillon mainly relied on the various distillation schemes for eliminating table wine 
surpluses (Figure 6 and 7). The estimation results thus suggest that crisis distillation measures for 
quality wine PSR are likely to have removed part of the burden on the table wine market in 
Languedoc-Roussillon (and to a lower extent in Aquitaine; the coefficient on wine PSR crop being 
not significantly different from zero). 
Considering the above estimation results, we conclude that distillation policy-distortions spilled 
over from quality wine PSR to table wine markets in significant ways, and that quality 
downgrading was another factor leading to spill-over effects across markets. Therefore, our 
results suggest that the effectiveness and efficiency of the CMO for wine is likely to have 
diminished further since the introduction of a ‘crisis’ distillation scheme for quality wines in 
1999, with a differential impact across regions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence that policy distortions have spilled over across wine markets in 
France. Distillation support measures aimed at addressing supply-demand imbalances have a 
long history in Europe’s wine market. Forty-five years after a complex and financially 
increasingly unsustainable Common Market Organization (CMO) for wine was introduced, the 
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European Commission had adopted proposals for a reform of the CMO for wine in 2007, which 
led to a phase-wise introduction of reform measures as of August 1st 2008, and a gradual 
phasing-out of distillation support measures. In finalizing the implementation of this reform 
package, the question is whether policymakers have begun to implement a reform that not only 
recognizes the budgetary consequences, but also the by-product and market distortions of current 
distillation support measures that are likely to have persisted so far.  
The paper addresses this question, focusing on three French key wine producing regions, and 
both on table wines and quality wines PSR. The analysis provides support for a differential 
adoption of quality downgrading by producers across regions, a practice whereby producers can 
sell quality wines PSR as table wines under certain conditions. Our estimation results of a 
heterogeneous panel (1981-2007) suggest that quality downgrading led to spill-over effects 
across markets, and that spill-over of distillation policy-distortions from the quality wine PSR to 
the table wine markets contributed to sustained wine surpluses since wines of lower quality were 
produced above levels that would have been produced in the absence of these market 
interventions. Considering that France is an intermediate case between Italy and Germany in 
terms of its production structure of quality and table wines, we would anticipate that similar 
spill-over effects of distillation policy distortions can be anticipated, particularly in Germany 
where quality wines PSR occupy a larger share of the wine sector than in France. 
However, a number of caveats remain. Our analysis has been constrained by the limited 
availability of French data at the regional level. We employed average monthly and average 
regional temperature data, yet region-specific data on the exact volumes of quality downgrading 
is missing. Despite the above caveats, we believe that several policy conclusions can be drawn 
from our analysis. The eligibility of quality wines PSR for crisis distillation since 1999 is likely 
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to have amplified the by then already existing market distortions in France through further spill-
over of policy distortions. The significant use of crisis distillation in the markets for table and 
quality wines PSR suggests that market participants faced constraints with regard to the use of 
quality downgrading. This was likely an intended policy outcome, since the EU objective of 
reducing market imbalances in the market for table wines focused on distillation measures since 
the 1970s, rather than on downgrading. Considering that high levels of allocative inefficiencies 
are likely to have prevailed for more than a quarter of a century, the gradual reform process that 
has begun on August 1st 2008 and thus the stepwise phasing out of support for by-product 
distillation, potable alcohol and dual-purpose grape distillation, as well as for crisis distillation 
measures by 2012 (European Commission, 2010, 2006c, 2007a, b; Council of the European 
Union, 2007; Europa, 2009)  should be seen in a positive light from an economic perspective. 
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